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THE VIRTUE OF A PROPORTIONAL
RESPONSE: THE UNITED STATES
STANCE AGAINST THE CONVENTION ON
CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Joseph Anzalone*
Mohammed Zayoun, a father of three children, noticed a small metal
cylinder marked with red and white warning tape while cutting
thyme in a field in Lebanon. Struck with curiosity, Mohammed
picked up the cylinder and placed it in his bag. Later that night,
Mohammed’s four-year-old daughter, Aya, rummaged through her
father’s bag and found the cylinder. Aya took the cylinder inside their
home and gave it to her sixteen-year-old sister, Rasha, who thought it
was a bell. The cylinder, an unexploded submunition from a cluster
bomb, exploded. Rasha’s brother Qassem, and their mother, Alia,
were both injured by shrapnel. Rasha lost her lower leg.1
―Cluster munitions are available for use by every combat aircraft in
the U.S. inventory, they are integral to every Army or Marine
maneuver element and in some cases constitute up to 50 percent of
tactical indirect fire support. U.S. forces simply cannot fight by
design or by doctrine without holding out at least the possibility of
using cluster munitions‖ – Richard Kidd, Director of the Office of
Weapons Removal and Abatement, United States Department of
State.2

*LL.M., The George Washington University Law School; J.D., American
University - Washington College of Law; A.B., University of Chicago. I welcome
all feedback at janzalone@law.gwu.edu. This Article benefited greatly from the
resources provided by The George Washington University Law School. In
particular, I want to thank Professors Burrus Carnahan and Robert Youmans for
their guidance and comments.
I also thank the staff members of Pace
International Law Review for their diligent edits and valuable feedback. Above all,
I will always be grateful to my parents, Giuseppe and Alfonza, for their
immeasurable love, support, and encouragement.
1 See Scott Peterson, Cluster Bombs: A War’s Perilous Aftermath, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 7, 2007, at World 1, available at http://www.
csmonitor.com/2007/0207/p01s01-wome.html.
2 Richard Kidd, Dir., U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of Weapons Removal and
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―It should be possible to reconcile what is acceptable from a
humanitarian point of view with what is militarily necessary and
politically feasible in order to prevent the unacceptable humanitarian
consequences of cluster-munition use.‖ – Jonas Gahr Store, Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Norway.3

INTRODUCTION
The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) bans the use,
production, and trade of cluster munitions. Cluster munitions are
weapons that open in midair to release tens to hundreds of
submunitions, or bomblets. The weapon can incapacitate an entire
convoy of military vehicles and personnel at once. However, it also
has proven to be inaccurate, spreading over large areas that include
civilians. Submunitions also tend to have a relatively high failure
rate—often landing without detonating, thereby remaining a
hazard for nearby and future civilian populations. The imprecision
of cluster munitions raises valid humanitarian concerns for its
inability to discriminate between military personnel and civilians.
In an effort to curtail future civilian casualties, several states
negotiated the CCM in a series of conferences dubbed the Oslo
Process. On May 30, 2008, participating states endorsed a final
draft of the CCM. States were able to sign the CCM beginning on
December 3, 2008.
The United States has refused to participate in the Oslo
Process because of military and procedural concerns. Its chief
objection is that cluster munitions remain an effective weapon in
armed conflict. The United States argues that its military strategy
relies heavily on cluster munitions, and to remove the weapon from
its arsenal would weaken its ability to defend itself and its allies.
Despite this objection, the United States has acknowledged that
current cluster munitions models create a risk to civilians and
should be regulated. However, it refuses to participate in the Oslo

Abatement (WRA), Is There a Strategy for Responsible U.S. Engagement on
Cluster Munitions?, Remarks at the Connect US Fund Roundtable Dialogue at the
Aspen Institute (Apr. 28, 2008), in 30 DISAM J. INT’L SEC. ASSISTANCE MGMT. 1,
117-20 (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/ Indexes/
v.30_3/Journal%2030-3.pdf.
3 Jonas Gahr Støre, Special Comment, Cluster Munitions, in U.N. INST. FOR
DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, 4 DISARMAMENT FORUM 3-4 (2006), available at
http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2529.pdf.
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Process, arguing that amending the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons (CCW) is a more appropriate means of
regulating cluster munitions.
This article argues that the United States should adopt strict
limitations in regards to its use of cluster munitions in lieu of
endorsing the CCM. The article aims to demonstrate that the
United States would significantly weaken its military capabilities
by endorsing the CCM in the near future, and therefore should not
do so. However, the United States should develop a better cluster
munition weapon and, in the meantime, should set parameters
regarding the use of cluster munitions to avoid violating
international humanitarian law. Part I provides a description of
cluster munitions, including physical components and use in armed
conflict. Part II surveys the growing controversy regarding cluster
munitions, based on international humanitarian law, which led to
the CCM. Part III profiles the development of the Oslo Process,
with a focus on the terms of the CCM. Part IV examines the
opposition by the United States to a ban on cluster munitions and
to the Oslo Process. Part V concludes with a proposal that will
decrease civilian casualties caused by United States cluster
munitions while putting the United States on a path to endorse the
CCM in the future.
I. CLUSTER MUNITIONS
Cluster munitions open in midair and scatter a number of
submunitions over an area that can be as large as one to five
football fields.4 The military utility of cluster munitions lies in the
weapon’s ability to destroy numerous targets at once.5 Once a
submunition hits its impact point, its casing breaks apart into more
than 300 pieces of shrapnel that can travel with enough force to
pierce armor.6 The shrapnel escapes from the explosion at 2500

4 See, e.g., U.N. INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH: THE HUMANITARIAN
IMPACT OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS, at 1-81, U.N. Doc. UNIDIR/2008/1 (2008), available
at http://www.unidir.org/ pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-92-9045-008-D-en.pdf [hereinafter
HUMANITARIAN IMPACT]; Thomas Michael McDonnell, Cluster Bombs over Kosovo:
A Violation of International Law, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 31, 42 (2002).
5 Mark Hiznay, Operational and Technical Aspects of Cluster Munitions,
Cluster Munitions, in U.N. INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, 4 DISARMAMENT
FORUM 15-25 (2006), available at http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2530.pdf
6 McDonnell, supra note 4, at 46.
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meters per second (compared to an automatic rifle bullet that
begins its trajectory at 750 meters per second).7 Whereas singular
weapons are aimed at one potential target at a time, the
submunitions in a single cluster bomb can impact multiple targets
with ferocity at once.8 Cluster munitions constitute an ―economy of
force‖ since they require ―fewer platforms (aircraft, artillery tubes,
etc.) to deliver fewer munitions to attack multiple targets, thus
reducing the logistical burden and the exposure of forces to hostile
fire.‖9 The terms ―cluster munitions‖ and ―cluster bombs‖ are used
interchangeably. However, cluster munitions encompass all forms
of delivery, including by air (cluster bomb) and ground (artillery,
missiles, and rockets).10
Cluster munitions have been used in combat since World War
II, when Soviet forces dropped cluster munitions on German tanks
and Germany dropped cluster munitions on the port of Grimsby in
the United Kingdom.11 Cluster munitions were first used in large
numbers by United States forces in Southeast Asia during the
Vietnam War.12 Early phases of submunitions relied on simple
fuses that armed according to the rate of spin of the falling
bomblet.13 The United States estimates that military aircraft
released up to 360 million submunitions throughout Southeast
Asia.14
As military strategy evolved to combat mass armored vehicle
formations instead of mass infantry attacks, submunitions also
evolved to include a shaped charge that could penetrate armor.15
To ensure that submunitions landed in a correct position, militaries
began to integrate parachute-like decelerating devices to add

Id.
See Hiznay, supra note 5, at 16.
9 Id.
10 See, e.g., HUMANITARIAN IMPACT, supra note 4; Steve Goose, Cluster
Munitions: Toward a Global Solution, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT
2004:
HUMAN
RIGHTS
AND
ARMED
CONFLICT,
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k4/12.htm.
11 Hiznay, supra note 5, at 17.
12 Id. at 15-16.
13 Id. at 16.
14 RAE MCGRATH, CLUSTER BOMBS: THE MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT
ON CIVILIANS OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS
16 (2000), available at http://
www.landmineaction.org/resources/Cluster_Bombs.pdf.
15 Hiznay, supra note 5, at 16.
7
8
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stability during freefall.16 The deceleration process made the spinfuse device obsolete, so a new generation of submunitions included
fuses that armed at the deployment of the parachute and set to
detonate at impact.17 In 1991, allied forces delivered approximately
fifty million simple-fuse and parachute-fuse submunitions in Iraq.18
During NATO operations in Yugoslavia in 1999, NATO sorties
dropped over 1500 cluster bombs containing almost 300,000
submunitions.19 From 2001 to 2002 in Afghanistan, the United
States used over 1200 cluster munitions that contained close to
250,000 submunitions.20
The newest generations of submunitions include guidance
packages that correct for winds, and sensor-fuses that are designed
to detect and destroy armored vehicles without producing a wide
anti-personnel effect.21 Sensor-fuse submunitions typically are
equipped with self-destruct or self-neutralizing capabilities.22
However, even these submunitions have been reported to suffer
from a significant number of failed explosives.23 Further, because
of the larger size of sensor-fused submunitions, one cluster
munition sometimes only can carry two submunitions.24 In 2003,
the United States and United Kingdom delivered approximately
two million parachute-fuse and sensor-fuse submunitions in Iraq.25
Over fifteen states26 have used cluster munitions during armed
conflicts that have occurred in at least twenty-eight countries.27
Id.
Id.
18 Id. at 16, 18.
19 Virgil Wiebe, Footprints of Death: Cluster Bombs as Indiscriminate
Weapons Under International Humanitarian Law, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 85, 95
(2001).
20 Hiznay, supra note 5, at 18.
21 Id. at 16-17.
22 Id. at 17.
23 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLDWIDE PRODUCTION AND EXPORT OF CLUSTER
MUNITIONS
4
(Apr.
7,
2005),
available
at
http://hrw.org/back
grounder/arms/cluster0405/cluster0405.pdf.
24 Hiznay, supra note 5, at 17.
25 Id. at 18.
26 These include Eritrea, Ethiopia, France, Georgia, Israel, Morocco, the
Netherlands, Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tajikistan, United Kingdom,
United States, and the former Yugoslavia. See Cluster Munition Coalition, The
Problem, http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/the-problem/ (last visited Jan. 27,
2010).
27 These include Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and
16
17
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Thirty-three states have produced over 210 types of cluster
munitions, while seventy states are known to stockpile the
weapon.28 A 2004 military report revealed that the United States
has stockpiled 5.5 million cluster munitions that include a total of
728.5 million submunitions.29 The United States stockpile contains
more than three submunitions for every person in the United
States. A troubling aspect of the global stockpile is that many of
the submunitions are of the older generation containing simple or
parachute-fuses, which suffer from high failure rates.30 Four
widely stockpiled cluster munitions—the M483/M483A1 DPICM
artillery projectiles, the M26 MLRS rocket, the Rockeye bomb, and
the CBU-87—have reported failure rates of 14%, 23%, 18%, and
7%, respectively.31 Of the United States’ reported 5.5 million
stockpiled cluster munitions, 3.3 million are M483/M482A1
munitions. Combining reported failure rates with the current
number of submunitions in the United States stockpile produces a
figure of potentially 100 million failed submunitions in the United
States arsenal.32
II. A GROWING CALL TO BAN CLUSTER MUNITIONS
A. International Humanitarian Law
Proponents for a ban on cluster munitions cite the weapon’s
innate imprecision and high failure rate as major concerns under
principles of humanitarian law. International humanitarian law
(IHL) provides the legal framework on which to base a prohibition
on cluster munitions. To be clear, no current international law

Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia,
Grenada, Iraq, Israel, Kosovo, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Montenegro, Saudi Arabia,
Serbia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Uganda, and Vietnam. Id. See
generally MCGRATH, supra note 14, at 30-42 (presenting a descriptive survey of the
historical usage of cluster munitions).
28 Hiznay, supra note 5, at 18.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 19.
31 Id.; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CLUSTER MUNITIONS A FORESEEABLE HAZARD IN
IRAQ
(Mar.
18,
2003),
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/es/reports/2003/03/18/cluster-munitions-foreseeable-hazardiraq [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IRAQ].
32 See Hiznay, supra note 5, at 19; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IRAQ, supra note 31.
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exists that specifically bans cluster munitions.33 Therefore, cluster
munitions are regulated as a weapon in armed conflict under IHL,
which includes the Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions
(Protocol I).34 Regardless of whether a state-party has signed
Protocol I, many of its provisions constitute customary
international law, and therefore apply to any party in armed
conflict.35 There are four principles set forth in Protocol I that are
vital to appropriately applying IHL to cluster munitions.36 The
first principle, expressed in Article 48, presents the ―rule of
distinction‖:
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all
times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants
and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly
shall direct their operations only against military objectives.37

The second principle, expressed in Article 51,38 presents the
―rule against indiscriminate attacks‖:
Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are
a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective; b)
those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot
be directed at a specific military objective; or c) those which
employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot
be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each
such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and
civilians or civilian objects without distinction. [Indiscriminate
attacks include] an attack by bombardment by any methods or
means which treats as a single military objective a number of
33 Louis Maresca, Cluster Munitions: Moving Toward Specific Regulation,
Cluster Munitions, in U.N. INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, 4 DISARMAMENT
FORUM 28 (2006), available at http://www.unidir.org/pdf/ articles/pdf-art2531.pdf.
34 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 48, Dec.
12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
35 Virgil Wiebe, For Whom the Little Bells Toll: Recent Judgments by
International Tribunals on the Legality of Cluster Munitions, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 895,
899 (2008).
36 See Maresca, supra note 33, at 28.
37 Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 48; see also Maresca, supra note 33, at 28.
38 See generally Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle of Discrimination in 21st
Century Warfare, 2 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 143, 147-51 (1999) (explaining the
indiscriminate and proportionality aspects of Article 51 of Protocol I).
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clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city,
town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of
civilians or civilian objects.39

The third principle, also expressed in Article 51, presents the
―rule of proportionality‖:
[It is prohibited to launch] an attack which may be expected to
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated.40

The fourth principle, expressed in Article 57, emphasizes the
―rule on feasible precautions‖:
In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be
taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian
objects. [All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in
any event to minimize] incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, and damage to civilian objects. 41

Military commanders look to these principles to set parameters
for use of force during armed conflict.42 The use of a weapon that
violates any of the above principles violates IHL. Unfortunately, an
application of these principles to the practical effects of cluster
munitions indicates that the prevalent types of submunitions and
methods of deployment seem to violate IHL.
B. Design vs. Effect
Cluster munitions are not designed to cause indiscriminate
casualties of civilian populations.43 They are specifically designed
to destroy entire columns of military targets with one bomb.
However, an appropriate analysis of the application of IHL to
39

at 28.
40

28.

Protocol I, supra note 34, arts. 51(4), (5)(a); see also Maresca, supra note 33,
Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 51(5)(b); see also Maresca, supra note 33, at

Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 57; see also Maresca, supra note 33, at 29.
See MCGRATH, supra note 14, at 12.
43 See Goose, supra note 10 (stating that ―cluster munitions are not inherently
indiscriminate: they can be used in such a way as to respect the legal distinction
between military targets and civilians‖).
41
42
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cluster munitions focuses on the weapon’s actual effect. An
assessment of cluster munitions’ legality under IHL examines the
practical effect of the weapon as delivered during armed conflict.
The typical characteristics of cluster munitions and the manner in
which it has been deployed in armed conflict raise serious doubts
about the weapon’s legality under IHL.
1. Absence of Aiming Mechanism
Cluster munitions are designed to scatter submunitions over a
wide dispersal area.44 After being released from their carrying
mechanism, tens to hundreds of submunitions often cover an area
of hundreds of square feet.45 This scattering effect raises concerns
under the rules of distinction and against indiscriminate attacks,
depending on where the cluster munitions are delivered.46 The
rules of distinction and against indiscriminate attacks may be
satisfied if cluster munitions are used to attack a convoy of military
vehicles away from population centers. However, the delivery of
submunitions to military targets situated in or near populated
areas may evidence the attacking party’s failure to distinguish
between military and civilian forces.47 When a party willfully uses
a weapon without having exercised an effective control over its aim
or impact area, that party fails to direct warfare only at combatants
and thereby uses the weapon in an indiscriminate manner.
Aside from sensor-fuse submunitions, the absence of guidance
during freefall means that the impact area of submunitions
remains at the discretion of the aerial release point and prevailing
winds. The more elevated the release point and the gustier the
wind, the greater the possibility that submunitions will fall or
parachute away from the intended impact zone.48 Such inaccuracy
violates the rule against indiscriminate attacks, specifically the
prohibition against attacks that ―employ a method or means of

44 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLDWIDE PRODUCTION AND EXPORT OF CLUSTER
MUNITIONS
(Apr.
7,
2005),
available
at
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/
lib.nsf/db900sid/EVIU6BCHED/$file/Cluster_Munitions_April_2005.pdf?openelem
ent.
45 See Maresca, supra note 33, at 28.
46 Id. at 29.
47 Id.
48 See McDonnell, supra note 4, at 49.
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combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective.‖49
By its very structure and because of the lack of control during
freefall, cluster munitions without sensors or guidance systems
cannot effectively discriminate between military targets and
civilian objects.50
2. Failure Rate
An unexploded submunition creates a lasting potential for
civilian casualties far after the official end of armed conflict. It is
common for a certain percentage of all munitions to fail during a
conflict.51 However, even a small failure rate can be disastrous
when one considers that millions of submunitions have been
released during various armed conflicts.52 If one generously
assumes a failure rate of 1%, a release of one million submunitions
amounts to ten thousand unexploded bomblets.
The most
conservative failure rate estimates a range from 2% to 5%, while
clearance personnel report failure rates of 10% to 30%.53
Submunitions have a relatively high failure rate, and only the
most recent models are equipped with automatic or manual selfdestruct capabilities. Though military contracts typically include a
required reliability rate, the acceptability rating in some contracts
has been as high as 5% to 12%.54 Failed submunitions act as de
facto landmines, lying in wait for the foot of a soldier, or the hands
of a child, to trigger its fuse.55 In Laos, for example, an estimated
nine to twenty-five million submunitions of those dropped during
the Vietnam War failed to explode.56 These submunitions have
caused over 10,000 civilian casualties since the war, with the
number rising every year.57
49

at 29.

Protocol I, supra note 34, arts. 51(4), (5)(a); see also Maresca, supra note 33,

50 James G. Stewart, The UN Commission of Inquiry in Lebanon: A Legal
Appraisal, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1039, 1056 (2007).
51 Maresca, supra note 33, at 27.
52 HUMANITARIAN IMPACT, supra note 4, at 2.
53 Hiznay, supra note 5, at 22.
54 Id. at 20.
55 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IRAQ, supra note 31; see also McDonnell,
supra note 4, at 56.
56 Hiznay, supra note 5, at 17.
57 See id.; see also Kevin Bryant, Cluster Munitions and their Submunitions—
A Personal View, Cluster Munitions, in U.N. INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, 4
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A variety of outside factors raise the failure rate, such as the
age of the submunition or the delivery technique.58 The level of
care exerted by soldiers in the storing and handling of cluster
munitions can also impact failure rates.59 Extreme temperatures,
hot or cold, can affect submunition performance.60 A submunition
that lands in mud, sand, or snow has an increased likelihood of
failure because of the soft impact.61 Falling through or getting
caught in trees and vegetation can cause submunitions to
decelerate and hit the ground without enough force to trigger an
explosion.62
The relatively high failure rate of submunitions creates
concerns regarding the rule against indiscriminate attacks and the
rule of proportionality.63 A known high failure rate of cluster
munitions provides an attacking party with knowledge that
significant numbers of submunitions will act as de facto landmines
until contaminated areas are clear. Even if cluster munitions are
delivered specifically to attack a military target, the attacking
party cannot guarantee that civilians will not, in time, pass along
the same area and accidentally detonate failed submunitions.64
This ―temporal‖ indiscriminate attack can be especially common if a
military convoy is attacked on what is normally used as a public
road or courtyard.65
Unless the attacking party intends to
decontaminate failed submunitions, or uses only submunitions with
self-destruct capabilities, this scenario raises concerns under
Article 51 of Protocol I.66
Failed submunitions and the absence of a guidance mechanism
DISARMAMENT
FORUM
45-49
(2006),
available
at
http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2533.pdf (providing a personal account of
the humanitarian crisis in Laos from experiences as a British soldier).
58 See, e.g., Hiznay, supra note 5, at 22; MCGRATH, supra note 14, at 7.
59 MCGRATH, supra note 14, at 6.
60 Hiznay, supra note 5, at 22.
61 MCGRATH, supra note 14, at 6.
62 Hiznay, supra note 5, at 22.
63 See Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 51 (discussing indiscriminate attacks and
proportionality).
64 See, e.g., MCGRATH, supra note 14, at 8 (arguing that a child who disturbs a
submunition months after the bomb was dropped is ―no less a measure of the
impact of that attack than if the child had become a casualty after just one day‖).
65 See
Wiebe, supra note 19, at 88 (using the term ―temporally
indiscriminate‖).
66 See generally id. (arguing that unexploded submunitions are de facto
landmines and are therefore ―indiscriminate killers‖).
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on most models combine to raise concerns regarding the rule of
proportionality, which prohibits an attack that causes excessive
civilian casualties or damage in proportion to the desired military
goal.67 The past impact on civilians from errant submunitions and
over the course of time from unexploded submunitions exhibits a
formidable risk of excessive civilian casualties whenever cluster
munitions are used.68 This potential for excessive casualties
dictates that only vital military goals should proportionally
outweigh the risk inherent in the use of cluster munitions.
Lastly, the rule on feasible precautions requires conflicting
parties to minimize danger to civilians from armed conflict.69 This
rule requires parties to take all precautions necessary—from
implementing attack strategies that spare the most civilian
casualties, to warning civilians of impending danger—to diminish
the collateral damage caused during armed conflict.70 When
applied to cluster munitions, this rule dictates that the attacking
party needs to consider and take every possible opportunity to
ensure that submunitions cause the least possible damage to
civilians.71 This would entail delivering the cluster munitions
during optimal weather, at an optimal height, as far away from
civilian centers as possible, and having a team ready to clear all
unexploded submunitions.72 However, it is clear—evidenced by the
ever-increasing amount of civilian casualties caused by cluster
munitions—that warring states have neglected the rule on feasible
precautions.

Maresca, supra note 33, at 29.
See supra Section I (surveying the regarding historical use of cluster
munitions in armed conflict); see also Maresca, supra note 33, at 29 (concluding
that ―past experience has put users on notice about the long-term dangers that
cluster munitions cause civilians‖).
69 Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 57; see also Maresca, supra note 33, at 29.
70 See generally MCGRATH, supra note 14, at 12.
71 Michael Slackman, Israeli Bomblets Plague Lebanon, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6,
at
2006,
at
A10,
available
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/06/world/middleeast/06cluster. html (citing an
unknown military expert admitting that cluster bombs are ―legal if aimed at
military targets and are very effective‖).
72 See generally Maresca, supra note 33, at 30 (discussing the variables
associated with the use of cluster munitions).
67
68
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C. Impact on Civilians
The method and quantities by which states have used cluster
munitions have created humanitarian emergencies in almost every
state that has experienced these weapons.
Civilians suffer
casualties from cluster munitions from the moment the weapon is
dropped up to years, and at times decades, thereafter.
1. Physical and Psychological Impact
In regards to collecting figures on the number of casualties
attributed to submunitions, it can be difficult to ascertain whether
a submunition or a different type of munition—such as a landmine
or other explosive remnants of war (ERW)—caused a victim’s
injury.73 In many cases, the victims cannot tell what caused their
injury, or recorded casualties do not specify between various forms
of ERW.74 However, submunitions cause specific types of injuries
because of the very nature of the weapon.75 Because of the outward
release of shrapnel, victims of submunition explosions often sustain
injuries to their upper bodies, including loss of extremities and
sight.76 The outward release of shrapnel also tends to cause
injuries to multiple individuals.77
A recent study concluded that civilians, especially children,
make up the majority of people killed from cluster bombs.78
Research in twenty-four countries confirmed at least 11,000
casualties, which translates to close to 100,000 casualties
worldwide.79 The study found that over 98% of casualties caused by
cluster munitions were civilians, while 75% of those casualties were
due to unexploded submunitions.80 In Kosovo, Cambodia, and
HUMANITARIAN IMPACT, supra note 4, at 10.
Id.
75 See generally MCGRATH, supra note 14, at 19-20 (providing a thorough
description of bodily injuries sustained by the explosion of submunitions).
76 HUMANITARIAN IMPACT, supra note 4, at 10 (citing RICHARD MOYES,
EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR: UNEXPLODED ORDINANCE AND POST-CONFLICT
COMMUNITIES 7 (2002)).
77 Id.
78 Handicap International administered the study.
Richard Norton-Taylor,
Civilians Main Cluster Bomb Victims, GUARDIAN, Nov. 3, 2006, at 24, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/nov/03/military.armstrade.
79 Id. The study confirmed casualties in twenty-four countries and used a
formula of extrapolation to calculate overall figures. Id.
80 Id.
73
74
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Afghanistan, boys younger than eighteen years of age represented
the largest casualty group.81 Children are likely to suffer the most
casualties because the yellow coloring of the bomblets and the
attached parachute combine to create a toy-like object. 82
In addition, states that sustain cluster munition impacts may
not have a healthcare infrastructure capable of effectively treating
the medical requirements of submunition victims. Families of the
victims are often forced to carry the injured for miles over the
course of several hours to the nearest medical facility.83 Even if
healthcare is available, families may be too poor to afford medical
treatment.84 The family of Rasha Zayoun, the girl in the opening
vignette of this paper, was unable to afford crutches for Rasha for
over a month after she lost her leg.85
Aside from physical damage, populations victimized by
submunitions suffer a severe psychological impact from their
ordeal. Victims of physical encounters with submunitions suffer
from a variety of emotions, including anger, depression, and
vulnerability.86 Adolescent victims are especially susceptible to an
inability to develop independence or trust.87 The presence of
unexploded submunitions also embeds a sense of terror in victims
and the overall population. The fear of walking in one’s community
for fear of triggering an unexploded submunition creates a
significant barrier to the restoration of normalcy and peace after an
armed conflict.88
2. Socioeconomic Impact
Unexploded submunitions also impact a community’s ability to
redevelop its physical and economic infrastructure.
Before
structural redevelopment can occur, submunitions must be cleared
Id.
See Bradley S. Klapper, Red Cross Steps Up Campaign Against Cluster
Bombs, Urges Ban, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 6, 2006, available at WESTLAW,
11/6/06 APALERTBUS 19:59:54.
83 HUMANITARIAN IMPACT, supra note 4, at 11.
84 Id.
85 See Peterson, supra note 1.
86 HUMANITARIAN IMPACT, supra note 4, at 11 (citing Beth Sperber Richie et
al., Resilience in Survivors of Traumatic Limb Loss, 23 DISABILITY STUDIES Q. 29,
32, (2003)).
87 HUMANITARIAN IMPACT, supra note 4, at 12.
88 Id.
81
82
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from all public areas. However, unexploded submunitions have
been found in houses, schools, hospitals, farms, businesses, and
even refugee shelters.89 Until these areas are cleared, civilians
cannot return to work to reestablish the economy.90 Civilians may
not even have safe access to water or other natural resources.91
Farmers cannot sustain a livelihood or produce food for their
communities when agricultural areas are littered with unexploded
submunitions.92 Those desperate for income must brave the
presence of unexploded ordnance throughout their crop and
farmlands.93 The loss of income for many civilians reverberates
across an economy that is likely still reeling from the presence of an
armed conflict.94
Unexploded submunitions also impede humanitarian personnel
from fulfilling their mission of clearing submunitions or
redeveloping the stricken area. Reports suggest that personnel
conducting clearance operations have suffered casualties in twentynine states and areas.95 Prior efforts to provide food packets to
civilians in Afghanistan have failed because civilians were unable
to differentiate the yellow food packets from unexploded
submunitions since they were similar in size and color.96 If the
area is considered too dangerous, relief workers are not permitted
to enter.97
Poor prospects of maintaining a livelihood, along with the
apparent danger of surrounding areas, combine to dissuade many
civilians from returning to their homes.98 In Lebanon, the highest
Id. at 13.
The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of
Civilians in Armed Conflict, ¶ 60, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2007/643 (Oct. 28, 2007) (explaining that the impact of cluster munitions include
―thousands unable to return to their homes; and devastated livelihoods as fields
are rendered unusable, harvests destroyed, and sources of income lost for a
generation.‖).
91 HUMANITARIAN IMPACT, supra note 4, at 14.
92 See MCGRATH, supra note 14, at 7.
93 See Slackman, supra note 71, at A10 (interviewing a farmer that claimed
that he must harvest his olives and wheat, despite unexploded submunitions,
because he would otherwise have no finances for the winter).
94 HUMANITARIAN IMPACT, supra note 4, at 15.
95 Id. at 11.
96 See Elizabeth A. Neuffer, Afghan Food Drops Found to Do Little Good,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 26, 2002, at A1.
97 HUMANITARIAN IMPACT, supra note 4, at 13-14.
98 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FATALLY FLAWED: CLUSTER BOMBS AND THEIR
89
90
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rate of civilian casualties from unexploded submunitions occurred
immediately after the conflict ended, as people returning to their
homes without knowledge of the apparent danger of submunitions
set off the charges.99 Since the hazard of unexploded munitions
remains until they are entirely cleared, civilians’ lives may be
disrupted for years or decades. Similarly, in Laos, the remaining
existence of unexploded munitions from the Vietnam War prevents
schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure projects from being
built to this day.100 In Kosovo, the areas contaminated with
unexploded submunitions still need to be cleared even seven years
after they were dropped.101
D. A Movement to Ban Cluster Munitions
The potential for unacceptable humanitarian costs through the
use of cluster munitions was recently displayed in the 2006
Lebanon War. During the last week of the 2006 Lebanon War,
Israel released numerous cluster munitions into southern Lebanon
apparently in response to Hezbollah’s use of over 100 cluster
rockets.102 Israeli cluster munitions had a failure rate of close to
70%, leaving up to one million unexploded submunitions in
southern Lebanon.103 Figures by United Nations indicated that
thirteen square miles—including 26% of Lebanon’s cultivatable
land—were contaminated by unexploded submunitions.104 United
Nations officials estimated that one million unexploded
submunitions covered an area that inhabited roughly 650,000
residents.105 Farmers could not harvest until United Nations teams
cleared areas of unexploded submunitions, for fear of setting one
off.106
USE BY THE UNITED STATES IN AFGHANISTAN 20 (Dec. 2002), available at
http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/1/HRW_fatally%20flawed%20Afghanistan.p
df.
99 HUMANITARIAN IMPACT, supra note 4, at 32.
100 Id. at 14.
101 Id. at 15.
102 See Peterson, supra note 1.
103 See Richard Boudreaux, Israel Criticized for Cluster Bombs, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2008, at A8, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/ 01/world/fgcluster1; see also Peterson, supra note 1.
104 See Peterson, supra note 1.
105 See Slackman, supra note 71, at A10.
106 See Peterson, supra note 1.
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Israel’s government-appointed Winograd Commission found
that Israel’s use of cluster munitions lacked ―operational discipline,
control and oversight.‖107 The United Nations calculated that fiftyfive demining teams would be able to clear most of the failed
submunitions by the end of 2007—eighteen months after the
Hezbollah-Israeli ceasefire.108 For many states that advocated for a
ban on cluster munitions, the gross abuse of cluster munitions in
the 2006 Lebanon War acted as a catalyst towards negotiating an
official prohibition.109
The Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) initially
appeared to be the best setting for discussions to regulate cluster
munitions.
The CCW seeks to protect combatants and
noncombatants from certain types of weapons.110 When the CCW
entered into force in 1983, it addressed incendiary weapons, mines,
booby-traps, and fragmentary weapons.111 The CCW has been
amended to include Protocol V, a Protocol on Explosive Remnants
of War.112 Though Protocol V standardizes the clearance of
unexploded submunitions, it does not establish regulations for the
use of cluster munitions during armed conflict.113
Boudreaux, supra note 103.
See Peterson, supra note 1. The United Nations has estimated the clearing
effort to cost $40 million. Id. Considering that failed submunitions dropped in
Laos over thirty years ago still kill and injure civilians to this day, clearing efforts
are well worth the cost. See Press Release, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Cluster
Munitions: ICRC Calls for Urgent International Action (June 11, 2006),
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/ihl-weapon-news061106?OpenDocument&style=custo_print.
109 The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of
Civilians in Armed Conflict, ¶ 61, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2007/643 (Oct. 28, 2007). If the 2006 Lebanon War was a final straw, then the
use of cluster munitions during the 2008 South Ossetia War surely provided
renewed motivation for states participating in the Oslo Process. See Russia
Accused of Using Cluster Bombs on Civilians, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE (Geneva), Aug.
26, 2008, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3692358 (last visited Nov. 15,
2008).
Georgian diplomats charged that many Russian cluster munitions
remained unexploded on roads and farms, ―resulting in civilian casualties on a
daily basis.‖ Id.
110 Arms Control Association, Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
(CCW) at a Glance, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/CCW (last visited Nov.
15, 2008) [hereinafter ACA,Convention]; Nout van Woudenberg, The Long and
Winding Road Towards an Instrument on Cluster Munitions, 12 J. CONFLICT &
SEC. L. 447, 474-75 (2007).
111 ACA, Convention, supra note 110.
112 Id.
113 Arms
Control
Association,
Cluster
Munitions
at
a
Glance,
107
108
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States advocating for a prohibition on cluster munitions
brought their concerns to the CCW in November 2006 with a
proposal to add Protocol VI, a Protocol on Cluster Munitions.114
However, the CCW requires a ―negotiating mandate‖ among its
state parties before negotiations can begin on any proposal.115
Russia, China, and the United States objected to starting
negotiations on cluster munitions, and the mandate was not
achieved.116 The only consensus reached during the meeting was
an agreement to assemble a group of experts in June 2007 to study
the possibility of a new protocol on cluster munitions.117
Frustrated with the slow-moving process, and the blockade on
talks from the United States, Russia, and China, a coalition of
treaty members led by Norway announced at the November 2006
meeting that they would begin negotiations outside of the CCW
process towards a ban on cluster munitions.118 Even though the
United States dropped its objection in June 2007,119 Russia and
China remained steadfast against starting negotiations on cluster
munitions.120 The effort headed by Norway came to be called the
Oslo Process.
III. THE CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS
A. The Oslo Process
The Oslo Process consisted of five conferences held over two
years by various states towards the negotiation of a prohibition on
the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions

http://www.armscontrol.org/node/3125 (last visited Nov. 15, 2008) [hereinafter
ACA, Munitions].
114 See id.; see also Maresca, supra note 33, at 30.
115 Woudenberg, supra note 110, at 475.
116 See ACA, Munitions, supra note 113; ACA, Convention, supra note 110.
117 SeeACA, Munitions, supra note 113; ACA, Convention, supra note 110.
118 See ACA, Munitions, supra note 113; ACA, Convention, supra note 110.
119 See Eliane Engeler, U.S. Ready to Negotiate on Cluster Bombs, MIL. TIMES
(Online), June 18, 2007, available at http://www.militarytimes.com/
news/2007/06/ap_clusterbombs_070618/ (reporting that the United States reversed
its objection ―due to the importance of this issue, concerns raised by other
countries, and our own concerns about the humanitarian implications of these
weapons‖).
120 ACA, Munitions, supra note 110.
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that cause unacceptable harm to civilians.121 Forty-nine states
attended the Oslo Conference in late February 2007 to begin
discussions on provisions and terms.122 The Oslo Conference
attendees pledged to complete a legally binding treaty by 2008 and
agreed to develop an international infrastructure to facilitate care
to victims, clearance of unexploded submunitions, destruction of
stockpiles, and risk education.123
The Oslo Conference—along with corresponding conferences in
Lima (May 23-25, 2007),124 Vienna (December 5-7, 2007),125 and
Wellington (February 18-22, 2008)126—helped to finalize the terms
of the treaty while allowing states to continue debates regarding
provisions that remained in dispute. During these conferences,
participating states debated three primary issues. The states
debated whether the adopted restrictions on cluster munitions
would take effect immediately, or whether the treaty would allow a
phasing period to give participating states the opportunity to
develop alternative weapons.127 A second issue was whether the
treaty would prohibit cluster munitions as a class of weapons or
allow for exceptions regarding technologically advanced models.128
121 Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, Declaration, Feb. 22- 23, 2007,
available
at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/selectedtopics/Humanitarianefforts/clusterinitiative/conference.html?id=449312
[hereinafter Oslo Declaration].
122 See ACA, Munitions, supra note 113.
123 See Oslo Declaration, supra note 121. See generally Addressing the
Humanitarian Impacts of Cluster Munitions: Key Issues (Oslo Conference on
Cluster
Munitions
Background
Paper,
2007),
available
at
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Hum/OsloCCM%20background%20
paper%201502.pdf (providing a concise overview of the initial objectives for
participants of the Oslo Process).
124 See Cluster Munition Coalition, CMC Report on the Lima Conference and
Next
Steps,
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/
2008/05/cmc-report-on-the-lima-conference-23-25-may.pdf.
125 See Cluster Munition Coalition, CMC Report on the Vienna Conference on
Cluster
Munitions,
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-content/up
loads/2008/05/report-on-the-vienna-conference-5-7-december.pdf.
126 See Cluster Munition Coalition, Report from the Wellington Conference on
Cluster
Munitions,
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-content/up
loads/2008/05/wilpf-report-on-wellington-conference-18-22-february.pdf.
127 ACA, Munitions, supra note 113.
128 Id. The debate over the proper definition of cluster munitions continued
until at least the Wellington Conference in February 2008. See John Duncan, U.K.
Ambassador for Multilateral Arms Control and Disarmament, Statement to the
Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions (Feb. 18, 2008), available at
http://ukunarmscontrol.fco.gov.uk/resources/
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Lastly, member states of NATO pushed for a provision that would
allow treaty signatories to cooperate militarily with states that
were not treaty members.129
While the debates lingered, over eighty states pledged to
continue with the Oslo Process by conferencing in Dublin in May
2008 to finalize terms to the treaty.130 By the time the Dublin
Conference opened, the number of participating states had grown
to 120.131
B. An Agreement in Dublin
On May 28, 2008, 111 states agreed to the finalized terms on
the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM).132 The last lift of
morale towards a final draft of the CCM was provided by the
United Kingdom, which announced its intent to sign the CCM after
having earlier withdrawn two major cluster munitions from its
arsenal.133 States were able to sign the CCM beginning on
December 3, 2008, and 104 states have signed by the end of 2009.134
The terms of the CCM exhibit the limitations the treaty sets
for the use of cluster munitions, along with the compromises
reached by the participating states. The CCM defines a cluster
munition as a ―conventional munition that is designed to disperse
or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20
en/pdf/5061551/postgv_cmstmt18Feb208.
129 See U.S. Opts Out of Landmark Cluster Bomb Treaty, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
May 30, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24889155/.
130 See Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions, Declaration, Feb. 18-22,
2008, available at http://www.clustermunitionsdublin.ie/pdf/declaration-wellen_001.pdf.
131 List of Countries Subscribing to the Declaration of the Wellington
Conference on Cluster Munitions, May 23, 2008, available at http://www.
mfat.govt.nz/downloads/disarmament/Well-Dec-list-of-subscribers-dijibouti
&swazi-2305.pdf.
132 Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster
Munitions, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dublin, CCM/77, May 30, 2008,
available at http://www.clustermunitionsdublin.ie/pdf/ ENGLISHfinaltext.pdf
[hereinafter CCM]; see Engeler, supra note 119.
133 See Editorial, Cluster Bombs, Made in America, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2008,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/01/opinion/01sun1.html.
134 United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of the Convention on Cluster
Munitions,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtds
g_no=XXVI-6&chapter=26&lang=en (last visited Jan. 10, 2010); Miles A. Pomper,
Arms Control Ass’n, Cluster Munitions Treaty Announced (June 2008),
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_06/Cluster (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
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kilograms.‖135 Notably, excluded from this definition are munitions
that (in order to avoid indiscriminate area effects and the risks
posed by unexploded submunitions) have all of the following
characteristics:
1.

Each munition contains fewer than ten explosive
submunitions;
2. Each explosive submunition weighs more than four
kilograms;
3. Each explosive submunition is designed to detect and engage
a single target object;
4. Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic
self-destruction mechanism; [and]
5. Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic
self-deactivating feature[.]136
In essence, the CCM does not set a blanket prohibition on cluster
munitions. Instead, it creates a heightened sophistication standard
for submunitions.
The CCM also sets an eight-year deadline for member-states to
destroy stockpiles of cluster munitions, but provides for a process of
requesting an extension in case a state needs additional time.137 In
accordance with the original objectives of participating states, the
CCM provides guidelines for clearing unexploded submunitions,
providing risk education, establishing a victim assistance program,
and enforcing the treaty.138 The CCM does not provide a sufficient
phasing period, as it is set to enter into force six months after thirty
states sign and ratify the treaty.139
Most notably, the CCM permits state parties to ―engage in
military cooperation and operations with States not party‖ to the
treaty, a victory for participants who are also members of NATO. 140
The CCM therefore allows parties to engage in military operations
and peacekeeping missions with non-state parties (i.e., the United
States) who have cluster munitions in their arsenal. Aside from
135
136
137
138
139
140

CCM, supra note 132, art. 2(2).
Id. art. 2(2)(c).
Id. art. 3(2)-(4).
Id. arts. 4, 5, 8.
Id. art. 17.
CCM, supra note 132, art. 21(3).
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the United States, other notable states—and major cluster
munition producers—that are unlikely to endorse the CCM are
Russia, China, Israel, Egypt, India, Pakistan, and Brazil.141 Article
21 should also come as a relief to the United States—which has
made very clear that it refuses to endorse the CCM—because it
allows the United States to continue joint operations with many of
its allies who intend to ratify the CCM (most notably, the United
Kingdom).
IV. UNITED STATES POLICY ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS
A. Rationale for Refusal to Endorse the CCM
The United States’ refusal to endorse the CCM is two-fold:
first, United States argues that the CCW, not the CCM, is the
proper venue to establish international restrictions on weapons;
second, it maintains that cluster munitions are essential to its
national defense and to the defense of its allies and can be used
within the parameters of IHL.
The United States insists that an international negotiation on
restrictions for cluster munitions should have occurred within the
framework of the CCW. It argues that the formation of a treaty
outside of the CCW undermines the ―framework of the CCW‖ that
has been in place for over twenty years.142 However, its principal
argument is that the CCW has as member-states the world’s
largest producers of cluster munitions such as Russia, China, and
the United States. Any meaningful and lasting agreement on the
limitation of a weapon must logically include the participation and
approval of major weapon producers and suppliers.
However, history has not always shown this to be the case. In
1995, the CCW took on the challenge of negotiating an agreement
for the restriction of anti-personnel landmines.143 The following
year, an impasse occurred between states that preferred a
conditional prohibition on landmines and states that advocated for

141 See Eamon Quinn & John F. Burns, U.K. Drops Opposition to Cluster Bomb
Ban, INT’L HERALD TRIB., May 29, 2008, at 5.
142 John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 478, 501 (2007).
143 Wiebe, supra note 19, at 159.
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a complete and total ban.144 The stalemate motivated several
states to develop a landmine treaty outside of the CCW process.145
This treaty, once entered into force, became known as the Ottawa
Treaty.146 The Ottawa Treaty failed to have the support of the
United States, Russia, and China. However, since its inception,
more than forty million landmines have been destroyed, and trade
in the weapon has ceased.147 Moreover, the United States has paid
more than any other country—$1.2 billion—to neutralize and clear
landmines.148 One cannot deny that overwhelming international
cooperation towards a treaty on a certain weapon has a ―shaming‖
effect for the use and trade of that weapon, regardless of the venue
in which the treaty was created.149
The United States also insists that cluster munitions are an
effective weapon ―when properly targeted and employed‖ so long as
the risk of collateral damage is considered when using these
weapons in armed conflict.150 Cluster munitions are effective
against an array of objects that are normally targeted during
combat: aircraft and airfields; battle tanks and other armored
trucks; troops; artillery; targets reported to be hidden in wooded
areas; hidden targets that cannot be hit by precision weapons, and
radio towers.151 The United States argues that cluster munitions
are unique tools against dispersed and moving targets such as
troops and armored vehicles.152 The ability of one pilot to strike
several targets minimizes the risk of enemy fire since fewer sorties

Id.
Id.
146 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, opened for signature
Dec. 3, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507 (entered into force Mar. 1, 1999).
147 See Editorial, Cluster Bombs, Made in America, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2008, at
Wk11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/01/opinion/01 sun1.html.
148 Id.
149 Sandeep Gopalan, Alternative Sanctions and Social Norms in International
Law: The Case of Abu Ghraib, MICH. ST. L. REV. 785, 836 (2007).
150 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT TO CONGRESS: KOSOVO/OPERATION ALLIED FORCE
AFTER-ACTION REPORT 90 (Jan. 31 2000), available at http://web
harvest.gov/peth04/20041027022740/www.defenselink.mil/pubs/kaar02072000.pdf.
151 MCGRATH, supra note 14, at 8.
152 See, e.g., Miles A. Pomper, Arms Control Ass’n, Cluster Munitions Talks
Gain Steam (Mar. 2008), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_03/ Cluster (last
visited Feb. 15, 2010); Maj. Thomas J. Herthel, On the Chopping Block: Cluster
Munitions and the Law of War, 51 A.F. L. REV. 229, 258 (2001).
144
145
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are necessary.153 The removal of cluster munitions from the United
States’ arsenal would risk the lives of soldiers and coalition
partners during armed conflict.154 Though some may argue that
future conflicts will focus mainly on counterterrorism or
counterinsurgency efforts, the Pentagon must still be prepared to
defend against failed states and to ―interact‖ with a strengthening
China and a more aggressive Russia.155 Cluster munitions remain
an integral defense against advancing armies and must remain in
the United States’ stockpile until more reliable and technologically
advanced cluster bombs can fill the arsenal.156 According to State
Department officials, abandoning cluster munitions is simply not
tenable from a military standpoint.157
The United States disagrees with the notion that cluster
munitions inherently violate IHL or should be uniformly banned.158
Instead, technologically advanced cluster munitions—equipped
with self-destruct and guidance capabilities—can significantly
reduce the risk to civilians that raises concerns under IHL.159
Further, military planners can ensure that cluster munitions are
not fired in the vicinity of civilian areas.160 States can also speed
up clearance of unexploded submunitions.161 Even domestic critics
of cluster munitions agree that using technology to reduce the
percentage of unexploded submunitions and using appropriate
rules of engagement to curb the risk of errant munitions would
render cluster munitions less likely to create a humanitarian
crisis.162 The United States cannot endorse a general prohibition
Herthel, supra note 152, at 258-59.
See Engeler, supra note 119.
155 See Gates Approves New Defense Strategy over Objections of Service Chiefs,
INSIDEDEFENSE.COM, June 16, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.afa.org/
GatesApproves.pdf.
156 See Stephen Mathias, Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons, United States Intervention on Technical
Improvements (July 15, 2008), available at http://ccwtreaty.state.gov/state
ments/0715TechImprovements.html.
157 Alejandro D. Wolff, Deputy U.S. Permanent Representative, U.S. Mission to
the U.N., Statement at the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in
Armed Conflict (May 27, 2008), available at http://www.state.gov/
t/pm/rls/rm/105253.htm.
158 See Crook, supra note 142, at 501.
159 See Engeler, supra note 119.
160 Herthel, supra note 152, at 264.
161 Pomper, supra note 152.
162 See 145 CONG. REC. S10070-71 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1999) (statement of Sen.
153
154
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on an essential weapon in its arsenal when solutions exist that can
mitigate the weapon’s negative humanitarian impact.
B. Mitigation of Problematic Cluster Munitions
The United States ―recognizes the need to minimize the
unintended harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure associated
with unexploded ordnance from cluster munitions.‖163 Cluster
munitions have negatively impacted United States forces during
military exercises. During the 1991 conflict in Iraq, United States
forces, while conducting a night assault on an Iraqi-occupied
airport in Kuwait, were held back because they were unable to
traverse terrain covered with unexploded submunitions from allied
bombing.164 An investigation of military casualties in Operation
Desert Storm found that ―soldiers entering . . . battlefields would
encounter larger amounts of unexploded submunitions than
desired.‖165 Procedural manuals from the Pentagon include a
reminder to commanding officers to consider the potential risk of
unexploded submunitions to soldiers as they enter an area that has
previously been bombarded.166
The United States is aware of the weaknesses of cluster
munitions and has tried to diminish those weaknesses by
developing submunitions. During the Iraq War in 2003, the United
States, for the first time, used combat cluster submunitions
equipped with self-destruct capability.167 The United States also
used a dispenser that corrected any wind interference to increase
the accuracy of airdropped submunitions.168 Sensor-fused weapons
Leahy).
163 Memorandum from Robert M. Gates, U.S. Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’ys of the
Military
Dep’ts
et
al.
(June
19,
2008),
available
at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/d20080709cmpolicy.pdf
[hereinafter Gates].
164 See Christopher M. Centner, Ignorance is Risk: The Big Lesson from Desert
Storm Air Base Attacks, 6 AIRPOWER J. 25, 30 (Winter 1992), available at
http://www.airpower.Maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj92/win92/centner. htm.
165 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Operation Desert Storm: Casualties Caused
by Improper Handling of Unexploded U.S. Submunitions, GAO/NSIAD-93-212
(Aug. 1993), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pb at5/149647.pdf.
166 See Air Land Sea Application Center, UXO: Multiservice Procedures for
Operations in an Unexploded Ordnance Environment, at I-1 (July 1996), available
at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/uxo.pdf.
167 Goose, supra note 10.
168 Id.
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were also deployed that independently sensed, and then attacked,
armored vehicles.169 The Air Force and Army have both reported
on efforts to improve the reliability and guidance mechanisms in
their respective cluster munitions.170 The interest that the United
States shows in these new technologies is an encouraging sign that
its military hopes to someday move away from older, imprecise, and
indiscriminate cluster munitions.
The United States has also taken responsibility by helping to
decontaminate areas plagued by its unexploded submunitions. For
example, in 1990, the United States agreed to give $850,000 in
prosthetic devices for Laotian victims of bombing during the
Vietnam War.171 In 1996, the United States agreed to send
military personnel to Laos to assist in the clearing of remaining
unexploded submunitions.172 At the beginning of 2008, the United
States announced plans to create a ―quick reaction force‖ that
would be tasked with removing unexploded cluster bombs and
other ERW from civilian areas.173 In total, the United States has
spent close to $1 billion in clearing submunitions ―from East Asia to
Southeast Europe to the Middle East.‖174
The effort of the United States to achieve a balance between
protecting humanitarian principles and its security interests was
most recently displayed in the Pentagon’s new policy regarding
cluster munitions. New types of cluster munitions being developed
by the United States will have a functioning rate of 99% or
better.175 By June 2009, the Pentagon will begin reducing the
number of cluster munitions in its arsenal that do not meet the new
functioning rate requirement.176
Unfortunately, the new
Id.
See Wiebe, supra note 19, at 91.
171 Carmel Capati, The Tragedy of Cluster Bombs in Laos: An Argument for
Inclusion in the Proposed International Ban on Landmines, 16 WIS. INT’L L.J. 227,
239 (1998).
172 Id.
173 See, e.g., Jeff Abramson, Arms Control Ass’n, Quick-Reaction Force Contract
Awarded (Nov. 2008), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_11/ Quick_reaction
(last visited Feb. 17, 2010); Pomper, supra note 152.
174 Crook, supra note 142, at 501. See generally U.S. Dep’t of State, United
States Clearance of Unexploded Cluster Munitions (Feb. 23, 2007), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/february/81000.htm (providing a survey of
United States assistance in the clearing of unexploded cluster munitions).
175 See, e.g., Gates, supra note 163; Kidd, supra note 2.
176 See Lolita C. Baldor, Pentagon Wants Less Deadly Cluster Bombs, MIL.
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generation of cluster munitions is not scheduled to be available
until 2018.177
The time and investment that the United States has committed
towards developing cluster munitions and clearing unexploded
submunitions exhibits a genuine desire to reduce the humanitarian
impact of its weapons. It will take an estimated ten years for the
United States to begin using more reliable cluster munitions. In
the meantime, the United States will have to rely on its current
problematic supply.178 However, the implementation of certain
restrictions on the use of these cluster munitions can ensure that
the United States upholds IHL.
V. STRATEGY FOR A SOLUTION
As stated by Jonas Gahr Store, the Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Norway, ―[i]t should be possible to reconcile what is acceptable
from a humanitarian point of view with what is militarily
necessary and politically feasible in order to prevent the
unacceptable humanitarian consequences of cluster-munition
use.‖179
The CCM is a valuable addition to international law and a
product of a commendable process of international cooperation.
However, it would not be practical for the United States to endorse
the CCM at this time. There is abundant proof that the United
States’ military strategy depends on the ability to use cluster
munitions during military operations. Considering the position of
the United States in the world—as a member of NATO and as the
leading force in the global war on terrorism—weakening United
States’ military capability is tantamount to weakening the military
might of the Western world. Even if there is a likelihood that
future armed conflicts will revolve around counterterrorism
strategies and guerilla warfare, it is practical for any state to stay
prepared in the event that a more traditional conflict arises.
In the meantime, the United States must continue making
improvements to cluster munitions. Advanced guiding systems and
TIMES
(Online),
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177 See, e.g., Gates, supra note 163; Kidd, supra note 2.
178 See Kidd, supra note 2 (describing the dependency of the United States
military on cluster munitions).
179 Støre, supra note 3, at 3-4.
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sensor-fuses would provide the military with the ability to target
even small submunitions to help ensure that only military targets
are impacted when cluster munitions are used. The Pentagon has
the available remote technology to enable submunitions to be selfdestructible and self-deactivating, which would eliminate the
hazard of unexploded submunitions.180
A new generation of cluster munitions that includes this
available guidance and remote technology will have aiming
capabilities and a low failure rate. In essence, this new generation
of cluster munitions would satisfy the rules of distinction,
proportionality, feasible precautions, and the rule against
indiscriminate attacks. Moreover, the addition of this technology
would almost certainly bring the United States supply of new
cluster munitions into the exception clause (Article 2(2)) of the
CCM. Embracing and utilizing this technology may open the door
for the United States to willingly enter the CCM.
If the United States becomes involved in armed conflict before
its new generation of cluster munitions is available, strict
guidelines on the use of cluster munitions can ensure that the
United States upholds IHL. Knowing that its current arsenal
contains ―dumb‖ submunitions with high failure rates, the United
States should adopt a policy that these cluster munitions would not
be used on military targets in any vicinity of a population center.
By limiting the use of cluster munitions to attacking military
targets that are entirely secluded from civilians, the United States
would uphold the principles of distinction, proportionality, feasible
precautions, and the rule against indiscriminate attacks, even with
a weapon with known unreliability. To ensure, however, that
civilians are not endangered in the long term, the United States
should also adopt a protocol of quickly clearing unexploded
submunitions from affected areas in an expedited fashion after a
cease fire has been reached. Though this may be a burdensome and
costly process, the only other option for the United States—without
violating IHL—is to rely solely on precision-guided weapons until
the new generation of ―smart‖ cluster munitions is ready for use.

See U.S. State Dep’t Chronology on Humanitarian Landmine Action (July
14, 2003), available at http://usinfo.org/wf-archive/2003/030714/epf113.htm
(highlighting that the Pentagon began in the 1970s to replace ―dumb‖ landmines
self-destructing and self-deactivating ―smart‖ landmines); see also Hiznay, supra
note 5, at 16, 21.
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CONCLUSION
If the United States were to sign the Convention on Cluster
Munitions, it would render useless a weapon that is a pillar of its
current arsenal. Rather than endorse and ratify a treaty that
would substantially weaken its military strength, the United States
should wait until it updates its arsenal to include a generation of
cluster munitions that satisfy the standards of international
humanitarian law and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In
the meantime, however, the United States should refrain from the
use of unreliable cluster munitions in any situation where there is
a possibility that civilians may be impacted. Following this
guidance will prove that it is indeed possible to reconcile
humanitarian law with the use of cluster munitions.
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